G7 Urges Immediate Post-Quantum Cryptography Transition Amid Quantum Computing Threat

The G7 cybersecurity working group has urged governments and businesses to immediately start transitioning to post-quantum cryptography, citing concerns that practical quantum computers could soon undermine current public-key encryption systems. The group's report "Preparing for the Post-Quantum Era: A Call to Action" emphasizes that the transition should begin before quantum computers can effectively break existing cryptographic frameworks.
While the G7 did not specify when quantum computers will become commercially viable, it noted recent technological advancements suggesting quantum computers capable of breaking widely used public-key cryptography may emerge sooner than expected. The group specifically highlighted "harvest now, decrypt later" attacks as a major risk, where attackers collect encrypted data today to decrypt it with future quantum computers.
The blockchain industry is also taking notice, as blockchains store transaction records and some public key information long-term, making them potential targets for future quantum attacks. The G7 recommended not just developing new cryptographic algorithms but also establishing national policies, research initiatives, public-private collaboration, and procurement standards that consider post-quantum technology.
The European Union has already set specific transition timelines, introducing a joint implementation roadmap in June 2023 requiring member states to begin transitioning by the end of 2026, with high-risk systems required to start immediately and complete the transition by 2030. This marks a shift from purely technical considerations to regulatory and procurement frameworks.
Bitcoin is reviewing BIP-360, a soft fork proposal aimed at reducing long-term quantum attack risks by removing vulnerable taproot key path spending methods. However, BIP-360 alone cannot solve all quantum threats, particularly attacks targeting transactions on mempool, which would require implementing post-quantum digital signatures.
Ethereum is preparing broader upgrades, with co-founder Vitalik Buterin identifying in February's roadmap that validators' BLS signatures, KZG commitments, ECDSA account signatures, and zero-knowledge proofs at the application layer need to transition to post-quantum systems. Ethereum aims to build core post-quantum infrastructure by 2029, though full network transition may take longer.
A major challenge is cost: current ECDSA signatures based on secp256k1 are about 64 bytes, while standardized NIST ML-DSA-87 signatures can reach approximately 4627 bytes. Larger signature data increases storage and bandwidth demands, potentially raising transaction costs. For decentralized networks, higher node operating costs could affect network structure.
Thus, the most immediate risk facing cryptocurrency industry isn't quantum computers hacking Bitcoin or Ethereum today, but rather challenges in the transition process itself: community consensus on new signing systems, protocol development, infrastructure burden from larger signatures, and handling legacy wallets with exposed public keys.
Korean Source
This article is an English localization of a Korean-language crypto news report. Original headline: G7 "양자컴퓨팅 위협 대비 시급"…비트코인·이더리움도 긴장