Quantum Computing Threat Spurs Crypto Security Overhaul Amid $7 Billion Race

Despite rumors and anxiety, quantum computers threatening financial systems remain years away. However, preparation costs are already a reality.
In March, Google researchers estimated that sufficiently advanced quantum computers could break widely used 256-bit elliptic curve cryptography in minutes. This encryption secures cryptocurrency wallets, management systems, blockchain signatures, and much of the security infrastructure at financial institutions.
While Q-Day isn't imminent, governments are already planning. The risk is too great to ignore. The U.S. has allocated billions for transitioning federal systems to post-quantum standards, while NIST requires vulnerable algorithms phased out by 2035.
Cryptocurrency sector transitions face greater hurdles. Billions in assets may remain dormant for decades, old wallets might not be upgraded, and institutional management systems were built using encryption expected to be broken by quantum computers.
Beincrypto spoke with experts from BitGo, Nethermind, and the cryptography community about necessary transition processes and cost responsibilities.
All three experts agreed institutions must fully identify every part using vulnerable cryptography—signing systems, hardware, recovery procedures, authentication, and long-term key storage. Dr. Nigel Smart, a computational number theorist, calls this a Cryptographic Bill of Materials (CBOM), similar to NIST's approach for early discovery and prioritization.
BitGo's Ashay Takuur highlighted another critical condition for institutional custody: NIST will release its first formal proposal for multi-party threshold cryptography in January 2026. Research presented at the MPTS workshop showed significant efficiency loss when using standard hash-based signatures with threshold signing.
Nitin Gaur of Nethermind, a blockchain infrastructure engineering firm, explained these issues affect entire systems across company operations.
Post-quantum security requires much larger keys and signatures. NIST's ML-DSA-65 uses 3,309-byte signatures and 1,952-byte public keys—compared to tens of bytes for current elliptic curve signatures. Some SLH-DSA variants reach tens of kilobytes.
As byte sizes increase in blockchain systems, bandwidth consumption, storage demands, and potential fee burdens rise. For proof-of-stake networks, Dr. Smart noted aggregating post-quantum standard signatures efficiently is difficult.
Takuur added user-side costs will spike at signature time due to larger data passing through multi-party protocols and increased latency.
A transitional period where classical and post-quantum signatures coexist could further amplify these cost burdens.
Custody for institutional assets is built on elliptic curve cryptography. MPC, hardware security modules, recovery procedures, and approval systems were all designed around this standard. Changing signature methods requires extensive revalidation of key control systems.
Gaur explained that MPC alone does not provide quantum resistance. Dr. Smart identified wallets, custody infrastructure, and smart contracts managing assets as the hardest to upgrade.
Bitcoin illustrates time sensitivity: A June 2026 report shows approximately 1.7 million BTC still reside in early addresses with exposed public keys—many likely dormant for life. If quantum computers become powerful enough before network migration completes, these coins could be vulnerable.
Smart anticipates responsibility will be shared among protocol developers, custodians, service providers, and asset owners, each managing different parts of the transition. Gaur instead advocates for centralized budgeting and senior accountability.
Public blockchains lack a single budget owner, making it impossible to force all participants to upgrade. Custodians can replace their signing systems but cannot compel dormant asset owners to move funds or apply consensus changes across the network.
The internet security sector shows large migrations can begin early: As of April 2026, Cloudflare reported over two-thirds of human-generated TLS traffic reaching its network already uses post-quantum security.
Korean Source
This article is an English localization of a Korean-language crypto news report. Original headline: 70억 달러 양자컴퓨터 암호화폐 구하기 경쟁